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Abstract 
 
This paper argues that financing policies of the firms are central in 
propagating financial crisis. Studies on the linkage between macro-
fragility and micro-vulnerability around financial debacle are common, 
especially after East-Asian and Mexican crisis in the 1990s. By focusing 
on the case of Indonesia, this paper investigates the relationship 
between the financing choice of the firms and their vulnerability in the 
mid of macro economic fluctuation. First step is to examine the impacts 
of macro variables on capital structure. Second is to investigate the 
impact of capital structure and firm performance. Accordingly, this 
paper takes into account the impact of macroeconomic fluctuation on 
firm healthiness where capital structure choices play pivotal role in the 
mechanism.    
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I. Introduction  
Before Asian crisis in 1997, analysis of the linkage between corporate balance sheet 
and macro economic variables is relatively neglected. And in the post-crisis period several 
researches are oriented to search the cause of the macro financial fragility by focusing on the 
micro variable.  
Terms of vulnerability and fragility itself are commonly used interchangeably.  
Dornbusch (1997) describe that vulnerability will happen if something goes wrong, then 
suddenly a lot goes wrong. In such a sense, financial vulnerability has emerged widespread 
around the world in the 1990s, indicated by a series of crisis:  Russia (1992 – 1993), Mexico 
(1994-1995) and East Asian countries (1997-1998). 
Meanwhile, domestic financial vulnerability is commonly associated with the global 
financial system, where financial liberalization becomes a pivotal mechanism to integrate 
domestic financial system into global system (Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza 2003)1. 
Moreover, by considering that banking sector is a major intermediation of the circulation of 
capital, it is also usually argued that liberalization guaranteed by implicit promises of a 
government, who is ready to give bailout of bad out-turns become important source of the 
vulnerability.  
By such a definition, vulnerability could be understood as the shock that negatively 
impact the financial sector where government has a risk to take over the responsibility by 
bailing out the financial sector.  
In Indonesia, since exchange rate was pegged in certain targeted value, the 1988 
financial sector liberalization have stimulated corporate sector to access foreign loan directly 
without hedging policies. Afterward, most of Indonesian firms have been leveraged in short-
term foreign debt. Two conditions emerged, namely “currency mismatch” and “maturity 
mismatch”. These two typical conditions are commonly referred to as factors triggering 
financial vulnerability.  
The main objective of this paper is to show how financing policies in firm sector in 
Indonesia contribute to the financial fragility and macro economic vulnerability. To do that, 
the strategy of this paper is as follow; first this paper captures the impact of macro economic 
factors on capital structure choices of Indonesian firms. The impact of industrial sector is also 
examined. Afterward, this paper describes the relation between capital structure choices and 
firm performance for capturing the impact of financing policies on firm healthiness. 
                                                 
1 They mention that in the liberalizing financial system, the inability of country to borrow loan in the local 
currency become an “original sin” which stimulates the financial vulnerability and then financial crisis.  
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Therefore, this paper provides a comprehensive analysis by including country specific 
factors, industrial sector factors and firm specific factors in analysing firm vulnerability 
around financial crisis in Indonesia.  
This evidence could shed light on the question of whether the corporate structure 
compounded the financial crisis or whether corporations were the innocent victims of a 
financial crisis brought on by other factors. Since crisis hit in 1997 around Asian countries, 
financing policies of the firms are widely assumed as important sources of crisis. Therefore, 
corporate sector is an active actor in propagating crisis.  
 
2. Description of Financing Policies in Indonesia  
It is widely accepted that capital structure of firms around Asian countries contributes 
to the financial fragility and financial crisis (Pomerleano 1998; Claessens et al. 2000; Booth 
et al. 2001, Allayannis et al. 2003). Furthermore, those studies also show that most firms in 
Asian countries have been fragile before crisis hit, where profitability declines and leverage 
increase before the crisis. Hence, it is difficult to argue that currency depreciations were 
solely needed because of macroeconomic reasons (Bris et al. 2002).  
Pomerleano (1998) show a thematic point that comes across all the result of the 
corporate financial analysis is unsustainable rapid and probably excessive investment in fixed 
assets financed by excessive borrowing in some Asian countries. And even in post crisis 
period, firms in Asia become more fragile (Bris et al. (2002). Or in other words currency 
depreciations did not help to improve the financial behaviour of most Asian companies. 
The combination of high investment and relatively low profitability in some countries 
meant that much external financing was needed (Claessens et al. 1998). They argue that some 
of the vulnerabilities in corporate financial structures that have become a very apparent factor 
in triggering and aggravating East Asia’s financial crisis, were thus already in existence in the 
early 1990s. 
This paper begins the study by analyzing the financial ratios of listed companies in 
Indonesia using the accounting data provided by the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) and 
Indonesian Capital Market Directory published by ECFIN (Institute for Economic and 
Finance Research) in various publications. The accounting data covers the period 1994-2004. 
We include all non-financial sectors and exclude the financial sector, since the debt structure 
of banks and investment institutions is not comparable to that in other sectors. This paper uses 
panel data analysis with 2.366 observations from 278 companies listed in JSX during the 
period 1994 – 2004. The impact of the 1997 crisis on firm level is a major concern of this 
   
 4
paper. This paper therefore differentiates three important periods, namely before crisis (1994 
– 1996), during crisis (1997 – 1998), and post-crisis period (1999 – 2004).  
Related to the issue of the relationship between corporate balance sheet and macro 
economic condition, Gray and Stones (1999) explain three operational tools to gauge such a 
relation, namely simple financial indicators, corporate profit simulations and economic value 
estimate (EVE). Simple financial indicators, such as the ratio of corporate debt to equity and 
the ratio of debt to assets, can serve as rough-and-ready gauges of the vulnerability of 
corporations to macroeconomic shocks. In this initial research, this paper provides descriptive 
financial indicators on debt ratio and profitability. It could be leading indicators for analyzing 
the corporate vulnerability.  
In these following graphs, it is shown several key ratios that fluctuate over times (1994 
– 2004). Graph 1 and graph 2 describe how debt ratios fluctuate during times. Before crisis hit 
in 1997, the debt ratios tend to increase in both book and market value measurements. Debt in 
market value has a higher fluctuation than those of book value since market value is valuated 
based upon stock prices. For comparing to the neighboring countries, Fan et al. (2004) give an 
explanation that Indonesia is one of the five highest leverage ratios together with South 
Korea, Thailand, India and Brazil.  
 
Graph 1. Median (%) 
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Note: Total Book is sum of book value of leverage as the ratio of total debt to total 
debt plus book value of equity. LTBook is long-term book value of leverage (long-
term debt deflated by total debt plus book value of equity). STBook is short-term 
book value of leverage (short-term debt deflated by total debt plus book value of 
equity) 
Source: author’s calculation based on data from JSX’database and 
Indonesian Capital Market Directory (IDMD) - Ecfin 
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Graph 2. Median (%) 
Market-value of debts
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Note: Total Market is sum of market value of leverage as the ratio of total debt to 
total debt plus market value of equity. LTMarket is long-term market value of 
leverage (long-term debt deflated by total debt plus market value of equity). 
STMarket is short-term market value of leverage (short-term debt deflated by total 
debt plus market value of equity) 
Source: author’s calculation from various sources 
 
Claessens et al. (2000) describe that long-term debt was low in East Asia during pre- 
crisis period. We can see in graph 1 and 2 that short-term debt dominates capital structure 
among Indonesian firms in all periods of study. It is likely true that firms in Asia become even 
more fragile after the crises. By descriptive data of this paper, we can see that in post-crisis 
period short-term debt was still dominating.  
Like other neighboring countries in East Asia, Indonesia have been exposed to 
external capital rather than internal capital for financing the firms. This high rates of 
investment meant that companies in East Asian countries had to turn to external financing to 
make up for the lack of capital from retained earnings (Claessens et al. 2000). It is common 
phenomenon in developing countries where ratios of book value of debt tend to increase 
during recessions and fall during expansionary periods due to business cycle effects (Booth et 
al. 2001).  
Following graph (3, 4 and 5) show the composition of total debt, long-term and short-
term debts (all in book values) by industrial sector. We can see that following a financial 
crisis in 1997, most of industrial sector undermined higher debt-ratio in which the mechanism 
of balance-sheet effects was present. It is important to note that agriculture sector (sector 1) 
have a highest increase of debt ratio which could indicate that this sector had a high burden of 
foreign debt. 
In term of short-term debt, sector 4 (miscellaneous industrial sector) containing 
machinery and heavy equipment, automotive and components, textile and garment, cable and 
electronics industries had a highest ratio when crisis hit. It can be explained that this sector 
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have a high import component, so that they have to fulfill their operation by acquiring high 
short-term debt in foreign currencies.  
 
Graph 3. Median (%) 
Total book-debt by sectors
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Source: author’s calculation based on JSX’s database and Indonesian Capital Market  
Directory provided by ECFIN 
Sector 1 = agriculture 
Sector 2 = mining 
Sector 3 = basic industry & chemical  
Sector 4 = miscellaneous industry 
Sector 5 = consumer good industry 
Sector 6 = property, real estate & building construction 
Sector 7 = infrastructure, utilities & transportation 
Sector 9 = trade, service & investment  
 
Graph 4. Median (%) 
Short-term book-debt by sectors
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Sector 1
Sector 2
Sector 3
Sector 4
Sector 5
Sector 6
Sector 7
Sector 9
 
Source: author’s calculation based on JSX’s database and Indonesian Capital Market  
Directory provided by ECFIN 
Sector 1 = agriculture 
Sector 2 = mining 
Sector 3 = basic industry & chemical  
Sector 4 = miscellaneous industry 
Sector 5 = consumer good industry 
Sector 6 = property, real estate & building construction 
Sector 7 = infrastructure, utilities & transportation 
Sector 9 = trade, service & investment  
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Generally, following a financial crisis sector property (sector 6) has a highest debt 
ratio showed by high median debt ratio in both, long-term and short-term ratio.  
Graph 4. Median (%) 
Long-term book-debt by sectors
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Source: author’s calculation based on JSX’s database and Indonesian Capital Market  
Directory provided by ECFIN 
Sector 1 = agriculture 
Sector 2 = mining 
Sector 3 = basic industry & chemical  
Sector 4 = miscellaneous industry 
Sector 5 = consumer good industry 
Sector 6 = property, real estate & building construction 
Sector 7 = infrastructure, utilities & transportation 
Sector 9 = trade, service & investment  
 
These following two graphs describe two important determinants of capital structure, 
namely profitability and growth opportunity. These variables are shown for giving insight 
idea how firm performance before crisis hit in 1997.  
In graph 5, we can see that during 1994 – 1996 (before crisis period), Indonesian firms 
have diminished their profitability. It is confirmed that high investment with low profitability 
have resulted the high debt ratios. In graph 4, in term of growth opportunities Indonesian 
firms have a high fluctuation, whereas in the onset of crisis growth opportunities of 
Indonesian firms tend to diminish. It can be said that on the onset of crisis, Indonesian firms 
have been in danger since several “early warning system” in micro level have had emerged 
indications of financial distress. At least firm level data provide evidence that before crisis, 
firms have experienced unhealthy conditions.   
 
Graph 5. Median (%) 
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Note: Profitability is measured by ROA (Return on Assets) 
Source: author’s calculation from various sources 
 
This following graph (graph 6) show how is profitability in industrial sector. Sector 3, 
4, 6 and 9 are sectors in which crisis impacted much in their performance indicated by high 
loss in their profitability.  
 
Graph 6. Median (%) 
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Source: author’s calculation based on JSX’s database and Indonesian Capital Market  
Directory provided by ECFIN 
Sector 1 = agriculture 
Sector 2 = mining 
Sector 3 = basic industry & chemical  
Sector 4 = miscellaneous industry 
Sector 5 = consumer good industry 
Sector 6 = property, real estate & building construction 
Sector 7 = infrastructure, utilities & transportation 
Sector 9 = trade, service & investment  
 
Market-to-book ratio measures the growth opportunities by considering the market 
expectation of the firms. In many literatures, market-to-book ratio is used to mention Tobin Q 
which is measurement of the market expectation (opportunities) in the future of the firms. 
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This trend is influenced by fluctuation in capital market. We can see that in general, the trend 
of Q value of firms in Indonesia was decreasing following a financial crisis.  
Graph 7. Median (%) 
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Note: Market-to-book ratio is market value of equity deflated by book 
value of equity for measuring growth opportunities of firms.  
Source: author’s calculation from various sources 
 
Graph 8. Median (%) 
Market-to-book ratio by sectors
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Source: author’s calculation based on JSX’s database and Indonesian Capital Market  
Directory provided by ECFIN 
Sector 1 = agriculture 
Sector 2 = mining 
Sector 3 = basic industry & chemical  
Sector 4 = miscellaneous industry 
Sector 5 = consumer good industry 
Sector 6 = property, real estate & building construction 
Sector 7 = infrastructure, utilities & transportation 
Sector 9 = trade, service & investment  
 
Several studies (Claessens et al. 2000; Pomerleano 1998) confirm that in Asian 
countries debt ratios have increased and firm performance have decreased in the onset of 
crisis. They also shed light on how these conditions have been leaded by some institutional or 
countries specific factors. 
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3. Empirical Evidence 
3.1. Simple Model  
In equation (1) this paper uses two groups of measurements with six proxies of 
leverages as dependent variables. First group is leverage in book value which is divided into 
three proxies: total book value, long-term book value and short-term book value of debts. And 
second group is leverage in market value with three proxies, namely total market value, long-
term market value and short-term market value of debts. By these proxies we have 
comprehensive measurements in where we can extrapolate the static impact (book value) and 
dynamic impact (market value) simultaneously of the macro shocks on firm-level conditions. 
By short-term and long-term (book and market value) we can also evaluate the issues of debt 
maturities. 
This first regression captures macro variables or country specific factors on capital 
structure choices.  
 
(1) 
Leverages it = α + β1 Xmacrot + εit 
 
where  
Leverages:  
1. Total book value of debt =  total debt deflated by total debt plus book value of equity 
2. Long-term book value of debt = long-term debt deflated by total debt plus book value 
of equity  
3. Short-term book value of debt = short-term of debt deflated by total debt plus book 
value of equity 
4. Total market value of debt = total debt deflated by total debt plus market value of 
equity  
5. Long-term market value of debt = long term debt deflated by total debt plus market 
value of equity 
6. Short-term market value of debt = short term debt deflated by total debt plus market 
value of equity 
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Macro variables  
1. Inflation =
1
1
−
−−
t
tt
WPI
WPIWPI , where WPI is wholesales price index 
2. Interest rate US prime = annual interest rate in US  
3. Interest IDR = annual interest rate in Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) 
4. Real GDP growth = 
1
1
−
−−
t
tt
Y
YY , where Y is nominal gross domestic product 
5. Stock value = 
NGDP
Stockvalue  
6. Real Exchange Rate = 
IND
USAN
WPI
WPIE * , where En is nominal exchange rate 
 
In equation (2), regressions are employed to capture the relationship between capital 
structure choices and firm healthiness. Claessens et al. (1998) explain that the combination of 
high investment and relatively low profitability in some countries meant that much external 
financing was needed. The weak performance and risky financial structures of corporate 
mostly centered on capital structure choices.  
 
(2) 
Performanceit =  α + β1Xleverageit  + β2Xmacrot + εit 
 
For measuring firm performance this paper uses three measurements, namely profit margin, 
turn over and Altman Z-score.  
1. Margin = Earning before tax deflated by total sales 
2. Turn over = Total sales deflated by total assets 
3. Altman Z-score use five ratios in a company’s financial statements: working capital to 
total assets, and retained earning to total assets, earning before tax to total assets, 
market value of equity to total liabilities, and net sales to total asset. In equation it 
should be as follow (equation 4) 
  
(3) 
Z =1.2(X1) + 1.4(X2) + 3.3(X3) + 0.6(X4) + 1.0(X5) 
 
X1 = Working Capital/Total Assets 
X2 = Retained Earning/Total Assets 
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X3 = Earning Before Taxes/Total Assets 
X4 = Market Value of Equity/Total Liabilities 
X5 = Net Sales/Total Assets 
 
Categorization  
Z > 2.99  = healthy company 
1.81 < Z < 2.99 = gray zone 
Z<1.81  = unhealthy company 
 
3.2. Financing Policies and Macro Variables  
Corporate financing policies are likely induced by a combination of factors related to 
firm specific factors as well as industrial and macro economic variables. In comparative 
studies across countries, macro economic factors and others country specific variables are 
commonly considered to be more relevant and more powerful factors in explaining capital 
structure rather than industrial factors in concerning countries. This section focuses on macro 
economic factors, such as inflation, interest rate, economic growth, stock value and real 
exchange rate, influencing the capital structure of Indonesian firms. 
Table 1 (see appendix) show that most of leverage measurements have positive and 
significant relation (except long-term book debt) with a set of macro economic variables.  
Booth et al. (2001) find that in developing countries, higher economic growth tends to cause 
the increase of total book value of debt and long-term book value of debt ratios, whereas 
higher inflation causes them to decrease. Meanwhile Fan et al. (2004) show that for Asian 
countries higher inflation is associated with lower leverage but is only weakly associated with 
shorter debt maturity. 
In line with the findings of Fan et al (2004), this research finds that inflation is 
positively related to short-term book debt and short-term book debt and total book debt in 
Indonesia. It means that capital structure choice in shorter debt maturity is not influenced by 
the increasing of inflation rate. But in long-term book debt and long-term market debt, 
inflation decrease leverages, though it is weak.  
Booth et al. (2001) find a negative but insignificant relationship between leverage and 
inflation in their samples of 10 developing countries. Meanwhile Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimovic (1999) find a significant negative relationship between debt maturity and 
inflation for developed and developing countries. 
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In this study, we find that real GDP growth is negatively related to long-term book 
debt and long-term market and also total market debt. Meanwhile real GDP growth is 
positively related with total book debt, short-term book debt, and short-term market debt. But 
in general, real GDP growth is stronger associated with market value of debts rather than 
book value of debts, since the level of significant is relatively high (1 percent and 5 percent). 
However, this relation is different with most theoretical predictions, such as Booth et al. 
(2001) who predict positively association in total book value of debt and long-term book debt. 
In Indonesia, economic growth decreases with long-term book debt. 
Interest rate in both US prime and Indonesian Rupiah are negatively associated with 
total book debt, long-term book debt and short-term book debt (though all correlation in both 
interest rates is not significant). But in market value of debt, both interest rates influence 
differently.  Interest rate in domestic market, which is in Indonesian Rupiah, is positively 
related with total market debt, meanwhile interest rate in foreign market, which means US 
prime, positively associated with short-term market debt. 
Some studies provide empirical evidence how currency crisis aggravated firm capital 
structure and then firm performance. Balance sheet effect mechanism shows that exchange 
depreciation have induced corporate sector by exacerbating firms’ balance sheet with 
significant amount of foreign liabilities (Krugman, 1999; Labato et al., 2003). Since revenue 
of most companies is in local currency, augmentation of foreign liabilities has jeopardized 
most of Indonesian companies. In their case, many companies have demanded more debt to 
recover their maturity debt. But some of them have to restructure their business, if not they 
have to close their activities. However, the impact of the crisis on the firm level is various, 
whereas one important transmission of the exchange rate depreciation and firm-performance 
is through the impact of leverage. 
Surprisingly, this study found that real exchange rate is weakly related to leverage. 
The real exchange rate is positively and significantly related to total book debt, long-term 
book debt and total market debt. In other measurements of debt, real exchange rate is not 
associated with. It means that leverages increase with real exchange rate, higher exchange rate 
higher debt. It could be interpreted into two senses: first since balance-sheet mechanism 
works the value of debt is increase with exchange rate depreciation, and second depreciation 
of exchange rate require more debts to defend from risk bankruptcy. 
Allayanis et al. (2003) show that debt denominated in foreign currency deteriorate 
firm performance and enhance financial fragility in East Asian countries. In other sense, 
Booth et al. (2001) explain the business cycle effect commonly happens in developing 
   
 14
countries in where book-debt ratios tend to increase during recessions and fall during 
expansionary periods. 
In this study, it is shown how macro economic variable interrelates with leverages. 
Fan et al. (2004) link macroeconomic variables with debt maturities by supposing that 
countries with large amounts of bank deposits tend to have shorter debt maturities and 
countries with a greater presence of insurance companies have longer debt maturities. By 
cross-country data, they also find that the countries in which the firm resides, is a more 
important determinant of how it is financed than its industry affiliation. 
This paper considers stock market development and government international reserve 
as important institutional variables influencing capital firms’ structure choice. Stock market 
development induces capital structure choice, since it provides opportunities for firms to 
access external capital by selling their shares. Meanwhile, government international reserve 
becomes important leading indicator of crisis which should be important variable for 
estimating firms’ financing policies.  
By table 1, we can see that, in general, stock market development is positively related 
to book value but is negatively related to market value of debts. Stock market development 
increases with total debt and short term book debt. It can be said that stock market 
development increase with total book and long-term book debts, but decrease with long-term 
market debt, though it is weakly associated. 
 
3.3. Financing Policies and Firm Healthiness 
Some researches are concern on the impact of large depreciation on the firm 
performance (Forbes 2002; Desai et al. 2004)2. But it is likely neglected research on the 
impact of capital structure choices with firm healthiness3. 
This paper uses three measurements of firm healthiness in three senses, which are 
margin, turn over and Altman Z-score. The last proxy is widely used for measuring the risk to 
bankruptcy of firms.  It is important to evaluate the capital structure choices and firm 
healthiness, since most recent studies of crisis mention about financing policies as the 
important sources of financial fragility. 
Graph 9 shows how Altman Z score fluctuates overtimes. Consistent with other 
measurement of performance in before crisis period Altman Z –score tend to diminish. For 
                                                 
2 Theoretically, depreciations could enhance the firm competitiveness for export-oriented firm. But for others, 
large depreciation would be followed by a decline in output and severe recession 
3 Balance sheet effect perspectives are more giving attention on debt denomination not on the capital structure its 
self. See for example, Bonomo et al. 2004, Labato et al. 2003, Bleakley and Cowan 2002.  
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remembering, firms with Altman Z-score >2.99 are healthy companies, 1.81< Z <2.99 are 
grey zone and >1.81 are unhealthy companies. By these categorizations, actually in before 
crisis period most Indonesian firms are in grey zone, if not unhealthy condition.  
 
Graph 9. Median 
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Source: author’s calculation from various sources 
 
Graph 10. Median 
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Source: author’s calculation based on JSX’s database and Indonesian Capital Market  
Directory provided by ECFIN 
Sector 1 = agriculture 
Sector 2 = mining 
Sector 3 = basic industry & chemical  
Sector 4 = miscellaneous industry 
Sector 5 = consumer good industry 
Sector 6 = property, real estate & building construction 
Sector 7 = infrastructure, utilities & transportation 
Sector 9 = trade, service & investment  
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Other proxies of performance, namely turn-over and margin, show the comparable 
tendencies. Turn over was declining in the onset of the 1997 financial crisis, whereas the 
impact of currency crisis in the mid of 1997 was extremely wide on margin of Indonesian 
firms (see Graph 11 and 12).  
 
Graph 11. Median (%) 
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Turn over is sales deflated by total assets 
Source : author’s calculation from various sources 
 
 
Graph 12. Median (%) 
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Profit margin is earning before tax (EBIT) deflated by total sales 
Source : author’s calculation from various sources 
 
In table 6 (appendix), we can see that most ratio of debts are negatively related to firm 
performances by several different proxies. It means that, in general, more debt is riskier to 
bankruptcy as well as less margin and less turn over. Total book-debt and total market-debt 
are negatively related to margin in 1 percent level of significance. Meanwhile, total market-
debt is negatively related to margin, turn over and bankruptcy in 1 percent of significance.  
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Based on the level of significance, book value of debts is more powerful in estimating 
margin whereas in turn over market value of debts is better.  
 
4. Conclusion  
This paper brings a comprehensive explanation of capital structure and firm 
vulnerability around financial crisis in Indonesia. By the stages of analysis, we can find that 
exchange rate induce severely capital structure choices of Indonesian firms. Indeed, the macro 
fluctuation becomes a pivotal variable influencing the debt ratio of the firms, whereas the 
level of debt provokes firm vulnerability.  
By samples of 278 listed companies in Jakarta Stock Exchange, we can find that 
before crisis hit in 1997, the debt ratios tend to increase in both, book value and market value 
of debts. In market value, the fluctuation is higher since it is calculated by ratio of debt to 
market value of equity which the later is valuated based on stock prices. In the descriptive 
analysis, we can also see that short-term debt dominates capital structure among Indonesian 
firms. Accordingly, Indonesia firms have had a serious problem in the onset of crisis, whereas 
firms have diminishing profit with higher fluctuation in their growth opportunities. 
These findings are confirmed with some measurements of performance or healthiness. 
By Altman Z-score for measuring the risk to bankruptcy of firms it seem that in the onset of 
crisis, most of Indonesian firms have been in grey zone, if not unhealthy condition. Same 
tendencies have happened in margin and turn over. 
This paper provides empirical evidences how capital structure exacerbates firm 
vulnerability, and than financial fragility. These findings are important for better 
understanding of the 1997 financial crisis in Indonesia by bringing country specific, firm 
specific and also industrial sector specific factors where capital structure is influenced by 
macro shocks. Then, these financing policies aggravate firm-level performances.  
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Appendix 
Tabel 1. Macro and Capital Structure                                                                                                                                                   
 Total Book  LTBookLev  STBookLev  TMarketLev  LTMarket Lev STMarketL
ev 
 
Intercept 0.7471 *** 0.3251 *** 0.5017 *** 0.3840 *** 0.3078 *** 0.2750 *** 
 (0.0630)  (0.0354)  (0.0683)  (0.0296)  (0.0389)  (0.0313)  
RER 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000  0.0000 *** 0.0000  0.0000 *** 
 (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Domestic Interest Rate -0.0049 ** -0.0030 ** -0.0024  0.0021 ** 0.0014  -0.0004  
 (0.0024)  (0.0014)  (0.0027)  (0.0011)  (0.0014)  (0.0012)  
US Interest Rate -0.0553 *** -0.0286 *** -0.0339 *** -0.0234 *** 0.0193 *** -0.0121 *** 
 (0.0052)  (0.0029)  (0.0057)  (0.0024)  (0.0031)  (0.0026)  
Inflation 0.2287 *** 0.0348  0.2294 *** 0.0988 *** 0.1028 *** -0.0193  
 (0.0447)  (0.0255)  (0.0485)  (0.0193)  (0.0262)  (0.0226)  
Real GDP 0.0235 ** -0.0080  0.0376 *** -0.0052  0.0219 *** -0.0092 * 
 (0.0114)  (0.0064)  (0.0126)  (0.0050)  (0.0069)  (0.0056)  
Stock Market Development 0.7049 *** 0.2361 *** 0.5841 *** 0.1392 *** -0.0598 * 0.0241  
 (0.0606)  (0.0344)  (0.0665)  (0.0276)  (0.0366)  (0.0305)  
             
Number of obs 2539  2378  2363  2345  2308  2367  
R2 0.1192  0.0721  0.0707  0.1624   0.0446  0.0169  
X2 Hausman 1217.46  37.00  25.08  1.58  6.09  15.35  
Prob X2 0.0000  0.0000  0.0003  0.9538  0.4137  0.0177  
Specification FE  FE  FE  RE  RE  FE  
FE is Fixed Effect, RE is Random Effect, *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. Standard deviation is reported in parentheses for 
specifications 
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Table 2. Total Book Value of Debt and Firm Healthiness 
 Altman-Z  Turn Over  Margin  
Intercept 4.4724 *** 1.3578 *** 0.3023 *** 
 (0.5504)  (0.0806)  (0.0229)  
Total Book -3.5854 *** -0.0330  -0.1497 *** 
 (0.1921)  (0.0246)  (0.0081)  
Inflation -0.8534 ** 0.1514 *** -0.1419 *** 
 (0.3895)  (0.0507)  (0.0164)  
Domestic Interest Rate 0.0467 ** -0.0092 *** 0.0035 *** 
 (0.0211)  (0.0027)  (0.0009)  
US Interest Rate -0.0772 * -0.0490 *** -0.0070 *** 
 (0.0472)  (0.0062)  (0.0020)  
RER -0.0001  0.0000  0.0000 *** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Real GDP 0.1451  -0.0190  0.0057  
 (0.1042)  (0.0137)  (0.0043)  
       
Number of obs 2539  2533  2517  
R2 0.1483  0.0559  0.2496   
X2 Hausman 14.86  7.75  14.35  
Prob X2 0.0214  0.2570  0.0260  
Specification FE  RE  FE  
FE is Fixed Effect, RE is Random Effect, *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, 
respectively. Standard deviation is reported in parentheses for specifications 
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Table 3. Short-term Value of Debt and Firm Healthiness 
 Altman-Z  Turn Over  Margin  
Intercept 3.6957 *** 1.4048 *** 0.2529 *** 
 (0.6428)  (0.0797)  (0.0266)  
STDMarket -2.3197 *** 0.0344  -0.0809 *** 
 (0.3980)  (0.0494)  (0.0148)  
Inflation -0.7524 * 0.1608 *** -0.1512 *** 
 (0.4535)  (0.0562)  (0.0184)  
Domestic Interest Rate 0.0286  -0.0104 *** 0.0031 *** 
 (0.0248)  (0.0031)  (0.0010)  
US Interest Rate 0.1198 ** -0.0541 *** 0.0007  
 (0.0552)  (0.0068)  (0.0022)  
RER -0.0003 *** 0.0000  0.0000 *** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Real GDP 0.2061 * -0.0267 * 0.0062  
 (0.1224)  (0.0152)  (0.0049)  
       
Number of obs 2308  2304  2286  
R2 0.0296  0.0590  0.1371  
X2 Hausman 77.52  37.72  5.94  
Prob X2 0.0000  0.0000  0.4304  
Specification FE  FE  RE  
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Table 4. Long-term Value of Debt and Firm Healthiness 
 Altman-Z  Turn Over  Margin 
Intercept 2.9069 *** 1.3531 *** 0.2274 
 (0.5971)  (0.0767)  (0.0253) 
LTD Market -0.0977  -0.0737  0.0495 
 (0.4441)  (0.0570)  (0.0166) 
Inflation -0.9594 ** 0.1629 *** -0.1594 
 (0.4286)  (0.0550)  (0.0180) 
Domestic Interest Rate 0.0275  -0.0098 *** 0.0027 
 (0.0228)  (0.0029)  (0.0009) 
US Interest Rate 0.0676  -0.0502 *** -0.0007 
 (0.0505)  (0.0065)  (0.0021) 
RER -0.0002 *** 0.0000  0.0000 
 (0.0001)  (0.0000)  (0.0000) 
Real GDP 0.0823  -0.0252 * 0.0044 
 (0.1117)  (0.0144)  (0.0047) 
      
Number of obs 2367  2361  2348 
R2 0.0138  0.0571  0.1400 
X2 Hausman 34.35  81.86  10.40 
Prob X2 0.0000  0.0000  0.1087 
Specification FE  FE  RE 
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Table 5. Total Market Value of Debt and Firm Healthiness 
 Altman-Z  Turn Over  Margin  
Intercept 5.9654 *** 1.4698 *** 0.2903 *** 
 (0.6177)  (0.0857)  (0.0259)  
TotalMarket -8.1724 *** -0.2541 *** -0.2293 *** 
 (0.5014)  (0.0596)  (0.0177)  
Inflation -0.5401  0.1870 *** -0.1413 *** 
 (0.4131)  (0.0514)  (0.0172)  
Domestic Interest Rate 0.0567 ** -0.0101 *** 0.0043 *** 
 (0.0230)  (0.0029)  (0.0009)  
US Interest Rate -0.0756  -0.0503 *** -0.0073 *** 
 (0.0528)  (0.0066)  (0.0021)  
RER 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 *** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Real GDP 0.0870  -0.0148  0.0020  
 (0.1102)  (0.0139)  (0.0046)  
       
Number of obs 2345  2339  2323  
R2 0.1306  0.0661  0.1706  
X2 Hausman 17.67  6.34  4.57  
Prob X2 0.0071  0.3858  0.6004  
Specification FE  RE  RE  
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Table 6. Short-term Value of Debt and Performance                                                     
 Altman-Z  Turn Over  Margin  
Intercept 4.3135 *** 1.4250 *** 0.2684 *** 
 (0.6737)  (0.0770)  (0.0239)  
STD Book -3.3072 *** -0.0110  -0.1464 *** 
 (0.1975)  (0.0263)  (0.0082)  
Inflation -0.7853 * 0.1626 *** -0.1402 *** 
 (0.4181)  (0.0551)  (0.0174)  
Domestic Interest Rate 0.0459 ** -0.0100 *** 0.0038 *** 
 (0.0229)  (0.0030)  (0.0009)  
US Interest Rate -0.0337  -0.0545 *** -0.0038 * 
 (0.0509)  (0.0067)  (0.0021)  
RER -0.0001 ** 0.0000  0.0000 *** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Real GDP 0.2201 * -0.0252 * (0.0073)  
 (0.1151)  (0.0151)  0.0047  
       
Number of obs 2363  2359  2341  
R2 0.1210  0.0599  0.2473   
X2 Hausman 10.94  20.57  14.33  
Prob X2 0.0901  0.0022  0.0261  
Specification RE  FE  FE  
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Table 7. Long-term Book Value of Debt and Performance                                            
 Altman-Z  Turn Over  Margin  
Intercept 3.1999 *** 1.3550 *** 0.2491 *** 
 (0.5887)  (0.0757)  (0.0253)  
LTD Book -1.2827 *** -0.1099 ** -0.0346 ** 
 (0.3845)  (0.0494)  (0.0147)  
Inflation -0.9702 ** 0.1594 *** -0.1602 *** 
 (0.4237)  (0.0544)  (0.0179)  
Domestic Interest Rate 0.0275  -0.0097 *** 0.0027 *** 
 (0.0226)  (0.0029)  (0.0009)  
US Interest Rate 0.0361  -0.0519 *** -0.0022  
 (0.0507)  (0.0065)  (0.0021)  
RER -0.0002 *** 0.0000  0.0000 *** 
 (0.0001)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Real GDP 0.0661  -0.0259 * 0.0037  
 (0.1112)  (0.0143)  (0.0047)  
       
Number of obs 2378  2372  2359  
R2 0.0191  0.0586  0.1357  
X2 Hausman 42.04  57.72  8.05  
Prob X2 0.0000  0.0000  0.2345  
Specification FE  FE  RE  
   
 28
 
Graph 1 
Stock Value/GDP
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
Q4
1994
Q4
1995
Q4
1996
Q4
1997
Q4
1998
Q4
1999
Q4
2000
Q4
2001
Q4
2002
Q4
2003
Q4
2004
in
 p
er
ce
nt
 
source : Indonesian Central Bank, Bank Indonesia 
 
Graph 2 
Interest rate in different countries
0,00
5,00
10,00
15,00
20,00
25,00
30,00
35,00
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
20
04
period
pe
rc
en
t
Rupiah 
US Prime
LIBOR (3m)
SIBOR (3m)
Japan Prime
SIBOR (1year)
LIBOR (1year)
 
LIBOR = London Inter Bank Offering Rate, SIBOR = Singapore Inter Bank 
Offering Rate  
Source : Indonesian Central Bank, Bank Indonesia 
